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The Execution of Search Warrants
by H. PatrickFurman
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readily determine to whom the warrant
applies. The probable cause requirement
was met in People v. Johnson8 because of
the tight security around the house in
which the drugs were being manufactured
(no one who was not involved could get
in) and the sophisticated nature of the operation. It was clear that everyone inside
the home was involved and therefore reasonable to authorize a search of all those
persons.
A recent Colorado case illustrating these
principles is People v. Ornelas,9 in which
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that
it was permissible for the police, while executing a search warrant of the defendant's home, to detain him in handcuffs
and then, after cocaine was discovered in
the home, arrest him. The court held that
the detention was not a full-blown arrest,
but more akin to a Stone-Terry detention.' 9
The detention was based on the fact that
a neutral magistrate had already authorized the significant intrusion of a search
of the home, and justified by the need to
ensure officer safety, guard against destruction of evidence, and promote the orderly execution of the warrant."
Another exception to the Ybarra rule
may be created if the warrant itself authorizes the search of persons present
when the warrant is executed. The warrant issued in Johnson12 authorized a
search of the home and "all persons found
within or in the immediate vicinity of the
residence," and was based on probable
cause to believe that drug manufacturing
and selling were taking place in the home.
The defendant was found inside when
the warrant was executed and was arrested after $950 was found in his sock.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's denial of the defendant's motion to
suppress. Ybarra was distinguished because the search in that case took place in
a public place and because the warrant issued in that case did not authorize searches of persons.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals has held
that a no-knock search warrant that authorized the search of an apartment and
the persons found therein for implements
related to the manufacture and storage of
marijuana and LSD authorized the search
of the purse of a nonresident who was in
the apartment.13 The occupants were
handcuffed and the purse seized from a
bedroom. The police inquired as to ownership, and a nonresident juvenile claimed
ownership. The police found drugs in the
purse. The court suppressed the juvenile's
response to the question because the po34 / THE COLORADO
LAWYER/ APRIL 1998 / VOL. 27, No. 4
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lice should not have questioned the juvenile in the absence of a parent or guardian, but permitted the introduction of the
contents of the purse.

The Colorado Supreme Court reversed,
first noting that the trial court erred in its
reading of the affidavit, which, in fact, twice
used the word "premises." More importantly,the court held that the trial courts interpretation was "a hypertechnical construction" of a sort that has been condemned
by the U.S. Supreme Court."' The court
noted that affidavits are often drafted by
nonlawyers in the haste of a criminal investigation and that over-reliance on technicalities of the sort required by common
law pleadings may discourage the police
from seeking judicial approval before acting.
However, the court declined to adopt a
per se rule that all of the buildings at a location to be searched are automatically
included within the terms of the warrant.
The detective executing the search in this
case first searched the home, where he
found other items specified in the warrant,
and ended the search of the shed once he
found the shotgun. Therefore, there was
little danger of an improper exploratory
search. The court also warned against over-reliance on printed forms and reiterated that every affidavit and warrant "should
be carefully prepared to fit the requirements of the particular case."1 9
In United States v. Percival,20 the Seventh Circuit held that a search warrant
authorizing the search of a home also authorized the search of a car found in the
garage, even though the car belonged to
a third party.A car has less connection to
premises than does, say, furniture. However, the defendant's use of the car, coupled with the fact that the car was locked
in the defendant's garage and the defendant was in possession of the keys, established that the defendant had dominion
and control over the car sufficient to justify including the car in the scope of the
warrant. The court noted that the better
practice would be to include a description
of the car in the warrant, but holds that
such practice is not required by the Fourth
Amendment. Other courts have reached
21
the same general conclusion.
Even property with seemingly little connection to the fixed premises may fall
within the scope of a search warrant. In
People v. Tufts, 22 the police obtained a warrant to search the defendant's home after
validly arresting the defendant and others following a controlled buy of narcotics.
During the search, the police found a vinyl bag that apparently belonged to a defendant who did not live in the home but
had been arrested in connection with the
buy. The Colorado Supreme Court held

Scope of the Search
Warrant
The Fourth Amendment requires that
a warrant"particularly describ[e] the place
to be searched." Article II, § 7 of the Colorado Constitution requires that a warrant "describ[e] the place to be searched...
as near as may be." These requirements
are designed to prevent general searches 14 but, like other constitutional combe interpreted in a practimands, are to
5
1

cal fashion.

"Even property with
seemingly little connection to
the fixed premises may fall
within the scope of a
search warrant."

In United States v. Ross,16 the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that a warrant
that authorizes the search of fixed premises generally authorizes the search of
every part of the premises in which the
object of the search may be located, even
if such a search involves additional openings and entries. Thus, the police may
search cabinets and drawers in a search
for drugs that might be secreted therein.
Some parts of the premises have less
connection to the "fixed premises" than
others. The affidavit in support of the
search warrant issued in People v. Muniz 17 established probable cause to believe that the shotgun being sought was
located in the defendant's home. The warrant itself authorized a search of "the
premises above described." The police executing the search found nothing in the
defendant's home, so they searched a
small, unattached storage shed located
approximately thirty feet from the home
in an enclosed area to which the defendant had ready access. The shotgun was
found in the shed. The trial court suppressed the shotgun because the word
"premises" did not appear in the affidavit
and because the affidavit itself indicated
that the shotgun would be found in "the
house."
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that the search of the bag was authorized
by the warrant, particularly in light of the
fact that probable cause already existed
to arrest the defendant.
The generally broad interpretation of
the scope of a search warrant is not without limits. In United States v. Stanley,2
the Fourth Circuit held that a warrant authorizing a search of the defendant's mobile home did not authorize a search of
the defendant's car when that car was
parked in a parking lot used by several
residents of the mobile home park. The
car was near the mobile home, but was
not within the general enclosure surrounding the mobile home.
Information in the affidavit or warrant
may expand the permissible scope of a
search. The Colorado Supreme Court has
approved language in a warrant authorizing a search of a home and "all vehicles"
on the property,' rejecting a claim that
such language was impermissibly broad.
The court also has held that information
in an affidavit relating to the possibility
of blood evidence justified the seizure of
items, such as bedding, which might reasonably contain blood evidence, even when
no blood was visible at the time of the seizure. The same analysis justified the seizure of hair samples found on a shirt at
the scene of the search because the victim
of the offense had been hit on, and bled
from, his head. 5

Scope of the Search Itself
Obviously, the law enforcement personnel executing the search warrant are generally confined to the terms of the warrant. However, a good-faith mistake that
is understandable and objectively reasonable may bring an otherwise overbroad
search within constitutional bounds. In
Maryland v. Garrison,26 police obtained
and executed a warrant to search "the
premises known as 2036 Park Avenue
third floor apartment" They believed the
entire third floor was one apartment, and
the mistake was not discovered until they
had already discovered incriminating evidence in the second apartment on the
third floor. The U.S. Supreme Court, by a
6-3 vote, reasoned that both the warrant
and the execution thereof were proper because the mistaken information in the affidavit and the mistake in the actual execution were both objectively reasonable.
A flagrant disregard of the limits of a
search warrant may result in the suppression of all items seized in the search, including those items that were within the
scope of the warrant.27 In United States v.
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Foster,28 police officers executing a valid
search warrant seized, pursuant to their
standard policy, virtually everything of
value in the home, including items that
were neither contraband nor linked to any
illegal activity. The court found that the
officers acted "in flagrant disregard for the
terms of the warrant,"29 and suppressed
all of the items seized in the search, including the weapons that were the object
of the search. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed, 30 holding that the trial court's
findings were amply supported by the record and that this remedy, while extreme,
was justified in cases of flagrant disregard of the warrant.

The Knock and
Announce Rule
People v.Lujan 3' is a good starting point
for a discussion of the general requirement that the police knock and announce
their presence before entering premises
to execute a warrant. In Lujan, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that the rule
of prior notice dates back to a 1603 English decision. 32While no English cases created exceptions to this rule, exceptions
did develop in American decisions. Ker v.
United States3 made it clear that the federal constitution is not offended by the
creation of reasonable exceptions to the
rule.
The Lujan decision expressly approved
two exceptions to the prior announcement
rule. The first exception exists when the
warrant expressly authorizes forced entry without announcement. The second
exception exists when circumstances unknown at the time of the application for
the warrant, but learned before entry, give
the police probable cause to believe that
giving notice is likely (1) to result in the
destruction of evidence, (2) to endanger
life or safety, (3) to enable a party to be arrested to escape, or (4) to be a futile gesture. The court approved of the police
breaking down the door to Lujan's home
with a sledgehammer when, armed with
a valid search warrant, they noticed a light
burning in a rear room of the residence,
knocked on the door, waited about a minute, then knocked again and still received
no reply
As recently as 1995, the U.S. Supreme
Court noted the continued vitality of the
principle that the police generally must
knock and announce their presence before entering. In Wilson v. Arkansas,s5 the
Court held that the common law 'qmock
and announce" rule is part of the reason36 / THE COLORADOLAWYER/ APRIL 1998 / VOL. 27, No. 4

ableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. A failure to knock and announce is not automatically unreasonable, as the risk of danger to the officers
or of destruction of evidence may justify
a no-knock entrance, but the Court reiterated that there is a presumption in favor
of announcement.36

Securing the Premises
Law enforcement officials are sometimes
allowed to "secure the premises" prior to
the execution of a search warrant. In People v. Gillis,3 7 police arrived at the defendant's home and conducted a brief security search of the home before discovering
that the address on the warrant was incorrect. They told the defendant to wait
outside while they obtained a proper warrant. During the wait, the defendant consented to a search of his home, and eventually led the police to the property they
were seeking.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that
the brief security search was appropriate
in order to secure the safety of the officers.38 The court also held that the voluntariness of the consent to search was not
affected by the fact that police told the defendant that he had to wait outside, that
another warrant would be obtained, and
that the police would remain at the premises until that occurred; these comments
did not amount to improper threats or coercion because they were simply descriptions of permissible police actions.
The "protective sweep" rule has limits.
In People u Griffin, police developed probable cause to believe the defendant had
marijuana for sale in his home. Some officers went to obtain a warrant, while two
others went to the defendants home to "secure the premises" and take other "precautions" with the occupants. The officers
who went to the home went inside and
observed drug paraphernalia inside. The
Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the
suppression of the paraphernalia, ruling
that the entry could not be justified as a
protective sweep. The court upheld the
admissibility of the drugs seized pursuant to the warrant because the warrant
was not based on any information received from the officers who conducted
the illegal entry.
A similar limitation was noted in People v. Gifford,40where the police obtained
information that the defendant was buying stolen goods and prepared an affidavit
for a search warrant. Before receiving the
warrant, several officers went to the defendant's home, told three people on the

porch that a warrant was on the way, and
then entered without knocking. The trial
court found that the officers had violated
the knock and announce rule and that the
fact that they had told the three unidentified persons they were going in did not
alter that violation. The trial court also
found that the appropriate remedy was
suppression.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed,
noting that a forcible entry need not be
accompanied by physical violence 4' and
that the purpose underlying the ban on
such entries is to spare the residents the
shock of unannounced entries and to protect both the residents and the police from
the dangers that attend to unannounced
entries. There was no showing that the
subsequent seizure of the evidence was
independent of the initial illegal entry, so
suppression was the appropriate remedy.

Paperwork
Several cases have addressed questions
concerning the documents that must be
present at the time of the request for the
warrant or the time of actual search. In
People v. Donahue,4 the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the failure of the affiant
to attach to the search warrant the document specifying the items to be seized
rendered the search warrant constitutionally defective.
Recently, in People v. Staton,4 the Colorado Supreme Court held that an affidavit may be used to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment's particularity requirement
if (1) the otherwise defective warrant incorporates the affidavit by reference, (2)
both the warrant and the affidavit are presented to the magistrate issuing the warrant, and (3) the affidavit accompanies
the warrant during the execution of the
warrant. The third requirement may be
met if the police officer who is the afflant
controls and supervises the execution.
Some of the requirements relating to the
execution of a search warrant are based
in the rules or statutes, rather than in the
Constitution. In People v.McKinstry, 4 the
Colorado Supreme Court reversed a district court suppression order that had
been based on the absence of the affiants
name in the warrant. A police officer filed
an affidavit and obtained a warrant from
a judge. Rather than writing the name of
the affiant in the space provided on the
warrant, the judge caused the warrant to
read "any officer." The judge signed the
warrant and initialed the affidavit and the
attachment listing the property to be
seized. The warrant itself referred to the
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attachment, but not to the affidavit. A copy
of the affidavit was not left at the premises searched. The affidavit was returned to
the court with the executed warrant, but
the documents were not stapled together.
The trial court held that strict compliance with the requirements of Crim.P 41
(d) and CRS § 16-3-304 was required because the rule and statute were designed
to give effect to the right protected by the
Fourth Amendment. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that only
two of the four requirements of the rule
and statute-that the warrant itself contain an adequate description of the place
to be searched and an adequate description of the items to be seized-are required
by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, there is
no constitutional violation. However, there
clearly was a violation of the rule and the
statute because the warrant did not contain the name of the affiant. The trial
court held that excusing the failure to comply with this requirement violated the express mandate of the legislature. A fourperson majority of the Supreme Court
found this analysis to be overly technical,
and held that the defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of the affiantfs name
on the warrant because he later gained
complete access to the affidavit.

Conclusion
A thorough analysis of searches conducted pursuant to warrants does not end
with an analysis of the affidavit that was
filed in support of the request for the warrant. The actual execution of a search warrant is the point at which our constitu-

tional rights come face-to-face with the
power and authority of the government.
Prosecutors and law enforcement officials
must take care to ensure that warrants
are executed in a constitutional manner,
and defense counsel must challenge those
searches that are not so conducted.
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